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Abstract
The Echo protocol tries to do secure location verification using physical
limits imposed by the speeds of light and sound. While the protocol is
able to guarantee that a certain object is within a certain region, it cannot
ensure the authenticity of further messages from the object without using
cryptography. This paper describes an impersonation attack against the
protocol based on this weakness. It also describes a couple of approaches
which can be used to defend against the attack.
1 Introduction
Knowing the physical location of an entity can be very useful. Such knowledge
is useful for location-based access control or context-aware applications [4, 6, 9].
However, we must be able to ensure that we have the correct location of an
entity for it to be a useful factor in access control.
Location determination is the problem of finding out where an entity is
located at. In contrast, location verification verifies that an entity is indeed
located at where it claims to be, where the entity somehow finds out the location
by some other means. If the location determination mechanism is insecure, then
we can use secure location verification to ensure that an entity is located at a
certain location.
The Echo protocol [13] is an inexpensive location verification mechanism.
It is a packet-based distance bounding protocol [5] which takes advantage of
physical limits imposed by the speeds of light and sound. It is able to guarantee
that a certain entity is located within a certain region.
In this paper, we will show that the Echo protocol is vulnerable to imper-
sonation attacks. We describe the Echo protocol in section 2. In section 3 we
detail the vulnerability, while section 4 suggests modifications to the protocol
which help defend against impersonation attacks.
2 The Echo protocol
In Sastry et al. [13], which introduces the Echo protocol, the entity wishing to
prove its location claim is called the prover, while the entity which wishes to
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verify the claim is called the verifier. The protocol verifies that the prover is
located within a region centered around the verifier, which is called the verifier’s
region of acceptance. The protocol basically works by measuring the round trip
time of signals between the verifier and the prover. A round trip time that is
too long would imply that the prover is far away from the verifier. A complete
description is shown in figure 1.
Communication Phase:
1. p
radio
−→ broadcast : (l,∆p).
The prover broadcasts its claimed location l
and processing delay ∆p.
2. ts ← time().
v
radio
−→ p : N .
A single verifier v starts its timer and responds
with a random nonce N .
We require l ∈ ROA(v,∆p) and ∆p ≥
n
b0
+ n
bi
.
If no such verifier exists or ∆p is invalid, abort.
3. p
sound
−→ v : N .
tf ← time().
The prover echoes the nonce over ultrasound.
The verifier records the finish time.
Verifier Computation Phase:
4. if sent nonce differs from received nonce
return false
5. if tf − ts >
d(v,l)
c
+ d(v,l)
s
+∆p
return false
6. Otherwise, return true
Figure 1: Description of the Echo protocol.
The prover initiates verification by broadcasting its location. A verifier
whose region of acceptance includes the location is selected. The verifier sends
a nonce, which is a random bit string, to the prover by radio. After receiving
the nonce, the prover sends it back to the verifier by ultrasound. If the nonce
received by the prover is not the same as the one it sent, or if it took too long
for the reply to be received, then the prover’s location claim is rejected.
A reply is too late if it arrives later than what would be expected from the
signal travel time and processing delays at the prover. The time required for a
radio signal to reach claimed location l from verifier v is d(v,l)
c
, where c is the
speed of light and d(v, l) is the distance between v and l. The time required for
a sound signal to reach v from l is d(v,l)
s
, where s is the speed of sound. With a
maximum delay ∆p for the prover to respond to a message it receives, it should
take no longer than d(v,l)
c
+ d(v,l)
s
+∆p for the verifier to receive a reply.
The prover should be unable to predict the nonce the verifier sends, so it
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cannot send back a reply before the nonce is received from the verifier. There-
fore, if the prover is not inside the verifier’s region of acceptance, it will take
too much time for the reply to arrive at the verifier. This fact ensures that the
prover must indeed be within the region it claims to be if its location claim is
verified with the Echo protocol.
The Echo protocol itself does not require cryptography or time synchroniza-
tion between provers and verifiers. It only needs a reasonably precise clock
in the verifier and the means to communicate with radio and sound. It also
does not require prearranged setup between verifiers and provers. This makes
the protocol suitable for low-powered devices in spontaneous environments, e.g.
ubiquitous computing or sensor networks [11, 8].
3 Impersonation attack
The fact that the Echo protocol does not require prearranged setup nor cryp-
tography is touted as an advantage. However, the protocol in its original form
is unable to verify location claims in a useful way under these conditions. The
problem is not that the protocol falsely verifies a location claim for a prover, but
rather that anything else is unable to securely take advantage of the verification
result.
An obvious way to use the Echo protocol for access control is to first verify
the location of the prover, and then to grant access to the prover based on this
verification result. The specific steps are outlined more concretely as follows,
where we assume that the verifier also handles access control:
1. The verifier confirms the location claim of the prover.
2. The prover sends an access request to the verifier.
3. The verifier grants access to the prover.
One thing to note is that in the original paper, the prover’s identity is not
included explicitly in the messages sent between the verifier and the prover
during location verification. However, we cannot simply ignore the identity,
since the verifier would later on have no way of knowing whether an access
request comes from the same object whose location was verified. Thus we will
assume that the prover’s identity is included with all messages during location
verification.1 Incidentally, this also helps provers and verifiers filter out messages
that are not meant for them.
Unfortunately, we cannot hide the identity without resorting to cryptogra-
phy.2 If we wish to avoid the expense of cryptography, then we must assume
that the identity can be exposed to an adversary. The adversary can use this
1The content and encoding of an identity are unimportant as long as the identity is unique
to a prover and is the same during location verification and subsequence access requests. For
example, it could be the frequency at which the prover communicates with the verifier.
2Even with cryptography, we must take care in how we use it. For example, encrypting
the identity with a non-random cipher would simply result in another form of identity.
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identity to obtain illegal access in a location-based access control system, using
a form of run internal replay attack [14]. More concretely, the adversary can
impersonate the prover as follows:
1. The verifier confirms the location claim of the prover. The adversary
obtains the identity of the prover by eavesdropping on the communications
between the verifier and the prover.
2. The adversary sends an access request to the verifier, with the identity of
the prover attached to the request.
3. The verifier confirms that the entity who sent the access request is the
prover, and mistakenly grants access to the adversary.
The impersonation attack takes advantage of the fact that an adversary can
learn the identity of the prover from the messages exchanged during location
verification, which it can then use to create a valid access request. Theorem 1
expresses this intuition formally.
Theorem 1 Let i be the identity of the prover, ki a secret held by the prover,
F (i, ki,m) a function which maps an arbitrary message (e.g. an access request)
to a format accepted by the verifier, and m the actual message to the access
control system. An adversary can impersonate the prover when the following
conditions hold:
• i is exposed to the adversary during location verification.
• F (i, ki,m) is efficiently computable by anyone given only i and m.
• Any F (i, ki,m) sent to the verifier at any time is accepted as a valid
message from the prover after location is successfully verified.
Proof. Assume that the prover with identity i has gone through location verifi-
cation. The adversary learns i, which he can use to compute F (i, ki,m) for any
m. Since location verification has already finished, when the adversary sends
F (i, ki,m) to the verifier, it will be accepted as a valid message from the prover.
In other words, the adversary has successfully sent a message which the verifier
believes to be from the prover. ✷
If we simply attach the identity along with the access request, we do not
need the secret ki, and F in theorem 1 can be expressed as F (i, ki,m) = (i,m),
which can obviously be efficiently computed by anyone who knows the identity i
and a message m. With such an F , the Echo protocol satisfies the conditions
in theorem 1, so it is vulnerable to impersonation.
If we want to prevent an adversary from forging a message, the prover must
use a secret known only to itself and perhaps the verifier. Otherwise, the adver-
sary would be able to efficiently compute F (i, ki,m), since everything required
by the prover for its efficient computation would also be known to the adversary.
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Also, the verifier must be able to retrieve the identity i and the actual
message m when it receives F (i, ki,m). Without a previous arrangement with
the prover, the verifier will have to be able to do this without knowing the
secret ki.
If the verifier does not possess the secret ki, and m cannot be efficiently
computed from only F (i, ki,m) alone, i.e. without using the identity i, then
we require public key cryptography, or something at least as computationally
expensive, as is implied by theorem 2. Even if the verifier and the prover pre-
arrange to share the secret ki, we will still require symmetric key cryptography
or its equivalent, as is implied by theorem 3.
Theorem 2 Let function F satisfy the following conditions:
• F (i, ki,m) can be computed efficiently given only i, m, and a secret ki.
• F (i, ki,m) cannot be computed efficiently given only i and m.
• m can be computed efficiently given only i and F (i, ki,m).
• m cannot computed efficiently given only F (i, ki,m).
The function F can be used to create a public key cipher of equivalent compu-
tational cost and strength.
Proof. Define G(i, F (i, ki,m)) = m. By assumption, G can be computed effi-
ciently. We can create a public key cipher P by defining the encryption function
as E((i, ki),m) = F (i, ki,m) and the decryption function as D(i, c) = G(i, c),
where (i, ki) is the private key and i is the public key. From the given conditions:
• Encryption can be done efficiently given private key (i, ki).
• Encryption cannot be done efficiently without private key (i, ki), since
without ki we cannot construct (i, ki)
• Decryption can be done efficiently given public key i.
• Decryption cannot be done efficiently without public key i.
Therefore P is indeed a public key cipher. It is easy to see that it would
take the same amount of effort to break P as F , and that the computational
costs are equal. ✷
Theorem 3 Let function F satisfy the following conditions:
• F (i, ki,m) can be computed efficiently given only i, m, and a secret ki.
• F (i, ki,m) cannot be computed efficiently given only i and m.
• m can be computed efficiently given only i, ki, and F (i, ki,m).
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• m cannot be computed efficiently given only i and F (i, ki,m).
The function F can be used to create a symmetric key cipher of equivalent
computational cost and strength.
Proof. The proof is nearly identical to that of theorem 2.
Define G(i, ki, F (i, ki,m)) = m. By assumption, G can be computed ef-
ficiently. We can create a symmetric key cipher S by defining the encryp-
tion function as E((i, ki),m) = F (i, ki,m) and the decryption function as
D((i, ki), c) = G(i, ki, c), where (i, ki) is the secret key. From the given con-
ditions:
• Encryption can be done efficiently given key (i, ki).
• Encryption cannot be done efficiently without key (i, ki), since without ki
we cannot construct (i, ki).
• Decryption can be done efficiently given key (i, ki).
• Decryption cannot be done efficiently without key (i, ki), since without ki
we cannot construct (i, ki).
Therefore S is indeed a symmetric key cipher. It is easy to see that it would
take the same amount of effort to break S as F , and that the computational
costs are equal. ✷
If the message m can be easily retrieved from F (i, ki,m), the other require-
ments for F essentially require it to be a message authentication code or a
digital signature scheme, depending on whether the secret ki is shared or not,
respectively. Although message authentication codes can be more efficiently
than symmetric cryptography [10], digital signature schemes typically require
primitives from public key cryptosystems [3, 12]
We can conclude that an adversary can impersonate the prover after location
verification is done using the Echo protocol, if we do not allow the use of public
key cryptography when there is no previous setup between provers and verifiers.
4 Defenses
In this section we suggest a couple of approaches which can be used to defeat
impersonation attacks. They are based on avoiding the conditions listed in
theorem 1. As in [13], we assume the verifier to be trustworthy.
4.1 Cryptography
The simplest way to prevent an impersonation attack is to just bear the cost
of cryptography. Encrypting messages sent between the prover and the verifier
after location verification finishes ensures that an adversary would not be able
to send a valid forged message to the verifier.
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By pre-sharing a secret key between the prover and the verifier, they can
prevent adversaries from sending forged messages using symmetric cryptogra-
phy. We do not even need to use the keyed variant of the Echo protocol.3 The
verifier can use a table to look up the secret key associated with a given identity.
An adversary would not be able to create a valid forged message since it would
not be able to get the secret key from the identity.
We could also avoid the need for prearrangements between the prover and
verifier by using public key cryptography. We could actually use the public
key of the prover as the identity. Using the Echo protocol, the verifier can
confirm that the public key belongs to a prover that is located within its region
of acceptance. The adversary cannot learn the private key, so it would not be
able to send a forged message that is seemingly sent by the prover.
One thing to note is that we must take care to ensure that encrypted mes-
sages sent between the prover and the verifier cannot be used in a replay attack.
This can be done using a challenge response protocol, taking advantage of the
secret or public key known by the verifier. The design of such a protocol to
resist replay attacks [7, 2, 1] is beyond the scope of this paper.
4.2 One-way Echo protocol
While using cryptography is a simple solution to preventing impersonation at-
tacks, it is also an expensive one which negates one of the important advantages
of the Echo protocol, which is its frugal use of resources. Fortunately, we can
modify the Echo protocol so that it is resistant to impersonation attacks without
having to use cryptography.
The modification is very simple. Instead of sending the message after lo-
cation verification, the prover sends the message when it first initiates location
verification. By doing so, we circumvent the third condition in theorem 1, which
requires that any message sent after location verification finishes is accepted as
valid. The modified protocol, which we will call the one-way variant of the Echo
protocol, is described in figure 2. We note that the identity of the prover which
is implicitly included in each message during location verification is no longer
required for location-based access control, although it is still useful for filtering
out irrelevant messages sent by unrelated provers and verifiers.
Since the message is sent immediately before location verification occurs, an
adversary would not be able to send a forged message that would be accepted
by the verifier, simply because it would not be able to predict when the prover
would attempt location verification. Of course, the prover must avoid sending
messages at precisely predictable times, since an adversary could send a precisely
timed message with a very strong signal which “overwrites” the message sent
by the prover.
The one-way variant of the protocol has some limitations. The most impor-
tant one is that location verification must be done for every message. If there
3The keyed Echo protocol, which is described in the original paper, uses cryptography to
guarantee that a specific object is indeed where it claims to be, using a secret key pre-shared
between the prover and identifier.
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Communication Phase:
1. p
radio
−→ broadcast : (m, l,∆p).
The prover broadcasts a message m, its claimed
location l, and processing delay ∆p.
2. ts ← time().
v
radio
−→ p : N .
A single verifier v starts its timer and responds
with a random nonce N .
We require l ∈ ROA(v,∆p) and ∆p ≥
n
b0
+ n
bi
.
If no such verifier exists or ∆p is invalid, abort.
3. p
sound
−→ v : N .
tf ← time().
The prover echoes the nonce over ultrasound.
The verifier records the finish time.
Verifier Computation Phase:
4. if sent nonce differs from received nonce
do nothing
5. if tf − ts >
d(v,l)
c
+ d(v,l)
s
+∆p
do nothing
6. Otherwise, process message m
Figure 2: Description of the one-way Echo protocol.
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is a significant time interval between the sending of a message and the start of
location verification, an adversary can send its own message during that time
interval. Without using cryptography, the verifier would have no way of know-
ing that it is not from the prover. Since we would expect significant time gaps
between multiple messages, we would not be able to do location verification
once and expect the result to be valid for all of them.
Another limitation is that it is not useful for location-based access control
of information. In order to retrieve information, the verifier would have to
send it to the prover. If we send the information in the clear, then the signal
can be detected from outside the verifier’s region of acceptance, making access
control pointless. If we encrypt the information and send the ciphertext, then
the modification is unnecessary since we could have simply used the original
Echo protocol.
However, the one-way Echo protocol is useful for sending messages to the
verifier without requiring a reply. Such messages are well suited to specifying
actions on physical objects at the location, e.g. turning on lights or lowering the
volume of a speaker. We only care that the messages come from certain locations
in such situations, and we are not interested in concealing information, so there
is no need for cryptography. The prover can send a single message one-way to
the verifier using the modified protocol, which is why we suggest calling it the
one-way Echo protocol.
Messages sent with the one-way Echo protocol need to be short. If a message
is too long, an adversary will have enough time to notice the transmission and
overwrite later parts of the message with a strong enough signal. This limitation
can be overcome by sending a command to accept a message with a given hash
during location verification. The actual message would be sent separately, which
the verifier would check against the hash.
Despite these limitations, the one-way Echo protocol is an inexpensive way
to verify location claims, and is resistant to impersonation attacks. Like the
original Echo protocol, the protocol itself does not require cryptography nor
prearranged setup between provers and verifiers. Unlike the original protocol,
messages such as access requests need not be encrypted, since message trans-
mission is integrated into the protocol itself without opening the protocol to
impersonation attacks.
5 Conclusions
Location verification, which verifies location claims made by provers, can be
done using the Echo protocol. The protocol is able to guarantee that a prover
whose location claim is verified is indeed within the region it claims to be. It is
able to do this without requiring expensive operations such as cryptography or
time synchronization, nor does it require previous arrangements between provers
and verifiers.
Unfortunately, we cannot securely take advantage of a verification result
without using cryptography. We have shown that this is because the Echo
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protocol has the following properties. First, it does not hide the identity of
the prover. Second, an adversary can forge a message that can appear to be
from the prover. Finally, a valid message can be received at any time by the
verifier. In fact, any location verification protocol with these properties will be
vulnerable to impersonation attacks.
A simple way to defend against impersonation attacks is to lift the restriction
against using cryptography. We suggest a one-way variant of the Echo protocol
as an alternative. Although it is limited to sending short messages to the verifier
when no reply is expected, it is resistant against impersonation attacks, while
still maintaining the low resource requirements and spontaneity of the original
Echo protocol.
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